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THE WONDER OF IT ALL
Gerald N. Rosenberg*
Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the
Supreme Courtand Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (Farrar, Straus & Giroux
2009). Pp. 624. $35.00.
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008 (Harvard U.
Press 2009). Pp. 432. $29.95.
What wonderful books! Barry Friedman and Lucas (Scott) Powe have produced
books that belong on the bookshelves of anyone interested in constitutional history and
the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the United States. The books are well written (in
the case of Powe, beautifully written) and studded with fascinating, sometimes
delightful, historical tidbits. I took pages of notes that will enrich my lectures for years to
come. These books have clear arguments, are well organized, and are easy to follow.
Both authors are extremely well read, not only in the work of legal academics, but also,
and more importantly, in parts of the political-science literature on the role of the U.S.
Supreme Court. And yet, for all their considerable virtues, these books break no new
ground. Their theoretical arguments rehearse those made at least a half century ago, if
not earlier, and they suffer from all the same methodological and analytic faults as those
works. The wonder of these books is why the authors expended so much effort to
reproduce such well-known arguments. In the pages that follow, I briefly summarize the
arguments and the methodology, highlight some weaknesses, and then place the books in
the larger literature to wonder why these books have appeared now.
THE AIMS AND ARGUMENTS

It is not possible to do justice to works of such depth and scholarship in this essay.
The shorter Powe book is merely 350 pages of substantive text (387 pages with notes),
while Friedman's opus contains 385 pages of text and a whopping 203 pages of
footnotes! Acknowledging this limitation, a brief summary is important to provide a
basis for understanding my concerns and wonder.
The key argument of both books is that the U.S. Supreme Court does not stand
apart from the rest of the government and the society in which it operates. Rather, it
reflects the views of the society at large. "This book," Powe writes, "is a history of the
Supreme Court, placed within the context of a broader history of the United States and
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its politics." Chronicling that history, Powe's "dominant theme is that the Court is a
majoritarian institution.,2 Three hundred fifty pages later, in the last sentence of the
book, he reminds the reader of that theme, confidently predicting that "the Court will
continue to function as it has for most of its existence to harmonize the Constitution
with the demands of majoritarian politics." 3 For Powe, as his title suggests,
majoritarianism is filtered through political elites. He approaches the Court as "a part of
a ruling regime doing its bit to implement the regime's policies." 4 So, for example, in
discussing McCulloch v. Maryland,5 he writes: "Because each member of the Virginia
dynasty - Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe believed that implied powers
authorized chartering a bank, it was totally unreasonable to think that the justices would
come to the opposite conclusion." 6 His book is a study of the interests and demands of
political elites and how the Court works with them to further their interests.
Similarly, Friedman's aim is to provide a "chronicle of the relationship between
the popular will and the Supreme Court as it unfolded over two hundred-plus years of
American history." In that chronicle "the chief protagonists are the American people." 8
In Friedman's view, whatever power the Supreme Court has is given by the people: "To
the extent that the judges have had freedom to act, it has been because the American
people have given it to them. Judicial power exists at popular dispensation." 9 But the
"people" who dispense power can also take it back. If the Court deviates from
majoritarian views, it will be disciplined. For example, writing of the current Roberts
Court, Friedman states, "the long-run fate of the Roberts Court is not seriously in doubt;
its decisions will fall tolerably within the mainstream of public opinion, or the Court will
be yanked back into line." 1 0 This is because "[w]hat history shows is assuredly not that
Supreme Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but rather that they
come into line with one another over time."11 It is the "will of the people" that both
empowers and constrains the Supreme Court.
A crucial implication of both books is that the Court is not countermajoritarian.
That is, because its decisions are in line with the preferences of political elites (Powe) or
majority views (Friedman), the Court's decisions reflect widely held societal views
rather than constrain or impose on them. Friedman explicitly addresses this point, writing
that "[h]istory makes clear that the classic complaint about judicial review that it

1. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008, at viii (Harvard U. Press
2009).
2. Id. at ix.
3. Id. at 350.
4. Id at ix.
5. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

6. Powe, supra n. 1,at 69.
7. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and
Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 4 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009).
8. Id. at 16.

9. Id at 370. See also id. at 9 ("We have the Court we do because the American people have willed it to be
so."); id. at 367 ("Ultimately, it is the people (and the people alone) who must decide what the Constitution
means."); Friedman, supra n. 7, at 385 ("[W]hen it comes to the Constitution, we are the highest court in the
land.").
10.

Id. at 369.

11.

Id. at382.
HeinOnline -- 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 680 2009-2010

THE WONDER OF IT ALL

2011]

681

interferes with the will of the people to govern themselves - is radically overstated."l2
WRITING AND RESEARCH

The scholarship reflected in these two books is extraordinary. The Will of the
People alone has more than 3,100 footnotes! Both authors rely on primary-source
materials mostly newspapers of the day, congressional debates, and, sometimes, the
correspondence of political elites. In addition, both authors have an eye for the poignant
anecdote and colorful phrase, which makes reading them a delight. For example, in
describing some of the press reaction to congressional legislation removing Court
jurisdiction to hear the McCardle case, 13 Friedman quotes from The Independent which
described " 'that little bill which put a knife to the throat of the McCardle Case' " as a
" 'splendid performance.' "14 The Powe book in particular is beautifully written, studded
with memorable phrases and colorfully told stories. For example, in describing the
Southern view of the Fourteenth Amendment, Powe writes that "the ex-Confederates
accepted the Fourteenth Amendment as willingly as the Germans would agree to the
Treaty of Versailles fifty years later."1 5 Noting the claim that the Court is influenced by
election returns, Powe points out that it is "easier for the Court to follow the election
returns if several justices die or retire shortly after the election." 1 6 Considering the effect
of the abortion issue on party politics in the wake of Casey,17 Powe writes that "Roe
remained the gift that keeps on giving to Republicans." 8 And most poignantly, after
the Supreme Court ordered the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock,
Arkansas, in Cooper v. Aaron, 19 Powe recalls that Arkansas Governor Oral Faubus
ordered the Little Rock schools shut for the year, "although Central's reigning state
championship football team was allowed to play out its schedule because, as Faubus
noted, cancellation would be 'a cruel and unnecessary blow to the children.' "20
THE PRECURSORS

As delightful as they are to read, the main arguments that these books offer are not
new. They were made, albeit with substantially less detail, over half a century ago, most
notably by Robert Dahl and Robert McCloskey. And their essential insight goes back at
least a century. Indeed, in 1901, Finley Peter Dunne's fictional character, Mr. Dooley,
opined that "th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."21 Writing in 1937, in the
wake of the Court's capitulation to the New Deal, then Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote
to Justice Harlan Stone, "I must confess I am not wholly happy in thinking that Mr.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Exparte McCardle,74 U.S. 506 (1868).

14. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 132 (quoting The Independent (publication data unknown) (as quoted in
Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in UnitedStates History vol. 3, 199 (Little, Brown & Co. 1922))).

15. Powe, supra n. 1,at 124-125.
16. Id. at 194.
17. PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

18. Powe, supra n. 1,at 311 (referencing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

20. Powe, supran. 1, at 246.
21.

Finley Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in Mr. Dooley's Opinions 21, 26 (R.H. Russell

1901).
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Dooley should, in the course of history turn out to have been one of the most
distinguished legal philosophers." 22
In 1957, Yale democratic theorist Robert Dahl examined whether the Supreme
Court acts as a protector of minorities against majorities.23 He concluded that it did not.
"By itself," Dahl wrote, "the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national
policy."24 Dahl provided two reasons. First, he calculated the average number of months
between appointments, finding it to be twenty-two months. 2 5 Thus, on average, a oneterm president historically would likely have two appointments and a two-term president
would likely have four. Unless presidents chose poorly, the new Justices would likely
reflect the policy views of the president and the political coalition that elected him. This
meant, Dahl concluded, that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long
out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States."26 Further, Dahl examined how Congress responded to Court decisions
invalidating congressional acts. His conclusion was that if Congress cared about the
substantive issue at hand, it could pass similar legislation that, historically, the Court
would uphold. Dahl's overall conclusion was that "the Supreme Court is inevitably a part
of the dominant national alliance." 27
In 1960, Robert McCloskey published The American Supreme Court.28 In this
book, which Friedman describes as "justly famous"29 and Powe views as "[t]he best
single volume on the Court and American history," 30 McCloskey presents a historical
overview of the role of the Court. He argues that the "Court learned to be a political
institution and to behave accordingly."31 What he means by this is that the Court learned
to be politically sensitive, changing as political understandings changed. As McCloskey
put it, "the Court's whole history can be viewed as a constant, or at least repeated,
readjustment of role to suit the circumstances of each succeeding judicial era."32
McCloskey saw this occurring in two ways. First, the Court pretty much follows public
opinion. The Court, McCloskey wrote, has "seldom lagged far behind or forged far
ahead of America" and has "seldom strayed very far from the mainstreams of American
life." 3 3 Indeed, he writes that "it is hard to find a single historical instance when the

22.

David M. O'Brien, "The Imperial Judiciary": Of Paper Tigers and Socio-Legal Indicators, 2 J.L. &

Pol. 1, 22 (1985) (quoting Ltr. from Felix Frankfurter, Prof., Harv. L. Sch., to Harlan Stone, J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct.
15, 1937) (available in Lib. Cong., Manuscript Div., Stone Papers, Frankfurter File)).
23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme CourtAs a National Policy-Maker, 6

J. Pub. L. 279, 293 (1957).
24. Id. at 293.
25. Id. at 284. As of the end of 2010, the number of months between appointments has increased since 1957
to approximately thirty-one months for the twenty-one Justices appointed since then. This means that a oneterm president is likely to have at least one appointment and a two-term president is likely to have two or three
appointments. typically enough to sway the ideological direction of the Court.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Id. at 293.
28. Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (5th rev. ed., U. Chi. Press 2010).
29. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 11.
30. Powe, supra n. 1, at viii.
31. McCloskey, supra n. 28, at 261.
32. Id. at 70.
33. Id. at 261.
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34
Court has stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public demand." The
public gets what it wants because "[a]t no time in its history had the Court been able to
35
maintain a position squarely opposed to a strong popular majority." Second, the Court
has a developed sense of its own limitations. The "Court's own strength rest[s] on a
tradition of judicious self-restraint," 36 or "a lively sense of its own limitations."37 At
bottom, the Court has realized the truth of what Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 7838
wrote long ago, that it lacks power: "the Court's decrees are backed only by its own
39
prestige and ultimately by the willingness of the president to help enforce them." In the
end, then, McCloskey concludes that "the facts of the Court's history impellingly suggest
a flexible and nondogmatic institution fully alive to such realities as the drift of public
opinion and the distribution of power in the American republic." 4 0 And, in practice, this
means that "[t]he great fundamental decisions that determine the course of society must
ultimately be made by society itself."4 1
Finally, Martin Shapiro, in a seminal work published in 1981, pointed out that
"[n]o regime is likely to allow significant political power to be wielded by an isolated
judicial corps free of political restraints." 4 2 Pointing to "many" of the Court's
controversial "race and religion decisions," for example, he wrote that one of the main
roles of appellate courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, is as the "imposer of
national uniformity over local diversity." 4 3 Thus, Shapiro argues, courts that appear
countermajoritarian are more likely bringing policy outliers up to national standards.
As noted, both Powe and Friedman acknowledge and admire McCloskey's work.
Clearly, their books are richer, more detailed, and more colorful than McCloskey's."
And each author differentiates his work from McCloskey's. Powe points out that
"McCloskey's masterpiece was written when the New Deal dominated thinking about
the functions of the judiciary." 4 5 Thus, McCloskey viewed the Court primarily as "an
enemy or competitor of the other two branches of government" 46 rather than as part of
the ruling regime. Friedman faults McCloskey for failing to "grapple with just how
judicial power ha[s] been sculpted by those very instances in which the justices did in
fact overestimate their own power." 47 As my brief summary of McCloskey's argument
shows, neither claim is fully persuasive.

34. Id. at 260. See also id at 14 ("[T]he Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, flatly and for very long resisted
a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment.").
35. McCloskey, supran. 28, at 131.
36. Id. at 112.
37. Id. at 60.
38. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The
FederalistPapers463 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic ed., New Am. Lib. 1999).
39. McCloskey, supran. 28, at 37.
40. Id. at 260.
41. Id at 60.
42. Martin A. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparativeand PoliticalAnalysis 34 (U. Chi. Press 1981).

43. Id at 28.
44. In fairness to McCloskey, the Powe book is 131 pages longer and the Friedman book is 256 pages
longer, not including the 203 pages of footnotes.
45. Powe, supra n. 1, at ix.

46. Id.
47. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 11.
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THE SINS OF THE FATHERS

The methodological approach of both books, like that of McCloskey, is flawed in
at least four distinct ways. First, both authors reify the Court, projecting onto it an
intelligence and a farsightedness that treat nine Justices, or at least five, as one person.
But Court decisions are the aggregation of individual decisions. The Court does not react
to elites or public opinion, anticipate the future actions of other branches, or act to
protect itself from reprisals. It does not plan or act strategically. Individual Justices might
do all of these things and, combining together, act in concert, but that is a far cry from
treating the Court as a unitary actor with a mind and intelligence of its own. Reifying the
Court overemphasizes its predictability and understates the contingencies of individual
decision making.
The analytic categories on which both Powe and Friedman rely are imprecise. For
most of American history there has been no way to measure the views of the American
majority with any degree of certainty. Even with the advent of sophisticated public
opinion survey research in the mid-twentieth century, it is difficult if not impossible to
state with confidence the views of the American public to which the Court adheres.
Problems with doing so are legion, ranging from ill-informed and changing views to
differences in the intensity of preferences to methodological tricks with question wording
and order. Often, there are overlapping majorities, or multiple publics. Does a minority
with intensely held preferences better represent the views of Americans than a majority
with weakly held or no views? Friedman realizes these problems, writing that "there is
no single American voice,"48 but his analysis depends on identifying one.
Similarly, Powe's analysis requires him to identify both the existence and policy
interests of something called the "ruling regime." 4 9 What is such a beast? How does the
Court know when a ruling regime has come into existence or has disintegrated? Does its
political strength matter and, if so, how can the Court determine it? To whom does the
Court look to identify its interests? What if its members disagree, as they undoubtedly
will, over important issues? To which elites will the Court look? There are no simple or
easy answers to these questions, and Powe doesn't grapple with them.
Related to this concern with analytic categories is the question of evidence. What
counts as good evidence for elite or popular views? Both authors make use of newspaper
editorials, but they are particularly poor measures of broad views. Similarly, as noted
above, confidently knowing which elites speak for the regime, or which poll results are
meaningful and representative, is very difficult. Powe, in particular, makes many
unsupported claims. For example, comparing the reaction to Brown v. Board of
Education50 and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,5 1 Powe writes, "on fundamental issues,
losers accept a democratic defeat more readily than a judicial one." 52 No evidence is
provided for this claim. An alternative explanation, of course, is that the 1964 Act was
passed a decade after the 1954 Brown decision and views may have changed. Similarly,
48. Id at 17.
49. Powe, supra n. 1, at ix.
50. Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
52. Powe, supra n. 1, at 250-251.
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in describing Justice William Brennan's plurality opinion for the Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson,53 Powe writes, "[t]he four Democrats, by their actions [supporting strict
scrutiny], demonstrated a belief that the [Equal Rights] amendment process was a waste
of time." 54 How does he know? Perhaps the four Justices thought they were helping it
along, supporting the ruling regime?
The final way in which both analyses are flawed concerns the lack of causal
mechanisms. One of the most important lessons of social science is that correlation is not
causation. Merely because two variables are often found together doesn't mean that the
existence and behavior of one leads to or causes the behavior of the other. In order to
make a plausible causal claim, causal mechanisms must be identified that connect the
variables. Both Powe and Friedman make causal claims that Court decisions are the
product of elite or majoritarian views, but neither identifies the mechanisms by which
this might occur. Changing times, elite opinions, majoritarian views, etc., are not causal
mechanisms. From time to time each author hints at some possible mechanisms but does
no more. For example, Powe suggests that the "composition of the Court" 55 can lead to
different decisions, suggesting that the appointment process is a mechanism by which
Court decisions are brought into line with elite views. Friedman suggests that public
reaction to decisions,56 the ability of the public to "save a Court in trouble with political
leaders and . . motivate political leaders against it," 57 and "attacks from the Court's
most important observers, the legal community"58 could all be ways in which the Court
is induced to follow majoritarian views. But how any of these factors might work to
influence the Court is left to the reader's imagination.
The problem with unspecified mechanisms is that they do not let us understand the
conditions under which the Court will follow elite or majoritarian opinions and the
conditions under which it will ignore them. The argument of both books is that the Court
reflects popular and elite opinion except, of course, when it does not! Friedman suggests
one of my favorite analogies: the Court's relationship to the public is like that of a person
at the end of a bungee cord - ultimately tethered but with a lot of room to bounce. 59 Alas,
the analogy fails because the mechanisms by which a bungee cord works are very well
understood whereas the mechanisms by which the Court might be tethered to elite or
popular views are unspecified and poorly understood.
JUDICIAL IMPORTANCE AND THE "DIALOGIC COURT"

What purpose, then, does judicial review serve? For Powe, as noted above, the
practice of judicial review empowers the Court to further the interests of the political
regime. However, perceptively, Powe understands that the Court may not have a role to
play in dealing with many of the most important issues facing the country. He
understands that while the Justices may be
53. Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

54. Powe, supra n. 1, at 277.
55. Id at 254.

56. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 381.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 256.

59. Id. at 373.
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confident in [their] ability to mold the Constitution in order to solve some of America's
contentious issues . it must be noted (contra Tocqueville), not the hard ones like dealing
with the Wall Street financial crisis, health care, Social Security, trade policy, immigration,
the alternative minimum tax, and the deficit, as well as Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and
North Korea. 6 0
In contrast, for Friedman, the Court is more important, and his argument is more
complex. On the penultimate page of the book, he suggests that "perhaps the central
function of judicial review today is to serve as the catalyst for the people to take their
Constitution seriously, to develop their constitutional sensibilities, in the hope that they
will adhere to those sensibilities when the chips are down."61 In other words, the "value
of judicial review" is that it -'serves as a catalyst for the American people to debate as a
polity some of the most difficult and fundamental issues that confront them." 62 And as
the people debate, they give meaning to the Constitution: "it is through the dialogic
process of 'judicial decision
popular response
judicial re-decision' that the
Constitution takes on the meaning it has." 6 3
Friedman is far from the first scholar to propose a dialogic relationship between
the Court and the broader society. In 1975, in his posthumously published book, The

Morality of Consent, Alexander Bickel wrote that the "Court thus interacts with other
institutions, with whom it is engaged in an endlessly renewed educational conversation.
It is a conversation that takes place when . . . large 'constitutional issues' are decided.

And it is a conversation, not a monologue."64 The problem with both Friedman's and
Bickel's argument about constitutional dialogue is that it assumes the American public
has a sufficient level of knowledge about the Constitution and the Court to participate in

the dialogue. Decades of public opinion survey data provide no support for this
assumption.65
Public opinion data shows that Americans have little idea what rights the
Constitution enshrines or what the Court has decided. When Americans do know what
decisions the Court has reached they are not persuaded by them. "For example, large

percentages of Americans believe that the Constitution guarantees a job (29 percent),
health care (42 percent), and a high school education (75 percent); [and] that all state
court cases can be appealed to the Supreme Court (85 percent)

. . ."66 Apparently,

Americans view the Constitution as containing their preferred policy preferences
regardless of the constitutional text. 6 7

60. Powe,supran. 1,at 350.

61. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 384.
62. Id.at 16.
63. Id.at 382. See also id at 16 ("[T]he function of judicial review in the modem era [is] to serve as a
catalyst, to force public debate, and ultimately to ratify the American people's considered views about the
meaning of their Constitution.").
64. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 111 (Yale U. Press 1975).
65. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Irrelevant Court: The Supreme Court's Inability to Influence Popular
Beliefs about Equality (or Anything Else), in Redefining Equality 172, 187 (Neal Devins & Davison M.
Douglas eds., Oxford U. Press 1998), see generally Public Opinion and ConstitutionalControversy (Nathaniel

Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., Oxford U. Press 2008).
66.

Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know about Politicsand Why It Matters 98

(Yale U. Press 1996).
67. For an in-depth examination of data supporting this claim, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, Much Ado about
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In terms of the persuasive ability of the Court, reviewing the data in a 2008
compilation of the influence of Supreme Court decisions on the views of Americans in
fourteen substantive areas including desegregation, rights of the accused, school prayer,
abortion, gay rights, and the war on terror and civil liberties, Persily, Citrin, and Egan
found few effects. 6 Writing in the introduction, Persily summarizes the findings: "[I]n
the vast majority of the cases reviewed here, Supreme Court decisions had no effect on
69
the overall distribution of public opinion."
Part of the reason why Americans are not persuaded by Court decisions is that
most are unaware that the Court has acted, even on important issues. For example,
consider a supposedly very well known decision, the Court's 1973 abortion decision,
Roe v. Wade. In March 1982, a CBS News/New York Times poll asked respondents in a
national survey, "Does the U.S. Supreme Court permit or does it forbid a woman to have
an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy, or haven't you been following
this closely enough to say?" 7 1 Although this question was asked nearly a decade after
Roe v. Wade, and two years into the Reagan administration with its public and vociferous
commitment to overturning Roe v. Wade, nearly half of respondents (forty-nine percent)
had no idea. Others had it wrong, with ten percent of respondents saying that the Court
had issued a decision forbidding abortion. 72
The problem with Friedman's argument is that it confuses constitutional dialogue
with policy debate. Americans care about policy outcomes, not constitutional meaning
about which they know next to nothing. So, for example, Friedman is incorrect when he
writes that the Court's conservative decisions during the New Deal "ran up against the
American people's evolving judgment of what the Constitution meant." 73 Rather, the
decisions clashed with Americans' preferred policy outcomes. More generally, Friedman
argues that Court decisions "hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judgment
about the meaning of the Constitution." 74 No they do not. At best, they follow
Americans' policy preferences. It is disappointing that Friedman neglects this decadesold literature.
THE WONDER OF IT ALL

Towards the end of his book, Friedman writes that "[s]ometime around the end of
the first Rehnquist Court, a small band of political scientists and law professors
questioned the common assumption that judicial review ran contrary to the popular
will." 75 This may be true but, as I have noted, it was hardly a new question. It was,
however, pretty much new to legal academics. The question I conclude with is why they
Nothing? The Emptiness of Rights' Claims in the Twenty-First Century United States, 48 Stud. L., Pol., &

Socy. 1 (2009).
68.
69.
70.
71.

See generally Public Opinion and ConstitutionalControversy, supran. 65.
Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Public Opinion and ConstitutionalControversy, supra n. 65, at 8.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Roper Ctr. for Pub. Op. Research, iPoll Databank, CBS News/New York Times Poll,

http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html (Mar. 1982) (access limited to member institutions).
72. Id.
73. Friedman, supra n. 7, at 205.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id. at 364.
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discovered it now. 7 6
Starting in the last several decades of the twentieth century, there was a revival in
political-science scholarship on the Supreme Court. Influential work was published on
the role of the Court as an agent of social change,77 the influence of political ideology on
judicial decision making,78 and justices as strategic actors,79 to name but a very few
prominent works in a burgeoning field. For the most part, this work was ignored in the
legal academy. The work suggested, of course, that the legal academy's understanding
of Justices as principled, objective, impartial, and independent was a chimera.
At the same time that political scientists were investigating the political role of the
Court, the Supreme Court was changing from the politically liberal Warren Court to the
moderate Burger Court to the conservative Rehnquist and Robert Courts. The
progressive gains of the Warren Court in civil rights, environmental protection, and the
rights of criminal defendants, and the progressive gains of the Burger Court in abortion
rights and affirmative action, were seen by liberals to be under threat. The liberal belief
that courts were not only open to the relatively disadvantaged, but also their best hope,
was fading. As early as 1979, Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss, in the foreword to the
HarvardLaw Review, articulated the dismay that many liberals felt:
We have lost our confidence in the existence of the values that underlie the litigation of the
1960's, or, for that matter, in the existence of any public values. All is preference ...
Only once we reassert our belief in the existence of public values, that values such as
equality, liberty, due process, no cruel and unusual punishment, security of the person, or
free speech can have a true and important meaning, that must be articulated and
implemented - yes, discovered - will the role of the courts in our political system become
meaningful, or for that matter even intelligible.81
For some liberals, then, the role of courts hostile to their substantive vision was
unintelligible.
How, then, could liberals understand what had happened to the Supreme Court?
They could adopt the attitudinal or strategic models of Supreme Court decision making,
putting the blame on conservative Justices. The problem with this approach, however, is
that it might be equally applicable to any future liberal Justices or to past liberal
decisions, suggesting that Court decisions furthering the rights of the relatively
disadvantaged were political, not constitutional. Thus, it may be no surprise that, for the
most part, the legal academy has not come to terms with the attitudinal model. 82
Similarly, they might turn to the public-opinion literature findings that Americans neither
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understand the rights contained in the Constitution nor have much awareness of Court
decisions interpreting them. But this, too, is problematic for the liberal project of creating
a more just and equal society because it suggests that the Supreme Court and the
Constitution are somewhat peripheral to social change. Here, too, it is little surprise that
this literature has been mostly ignored in legal scholarship.
A more promising approach might be to turn to the older historical literature that
understands Court decisions as a product of majoritarian views and elite interests. If this
were the case, then right-wing courts were the fault not of the Court and the Constitution,
but of the people and their government. Changing electoral outcomes and popular views,
then, could lead to a liberal reinvigoration of constitutional law which would be
legitimate. In Fiss's words, it would make the role of the courts intelligible again. As
Friedman puts it in the last sentence of his book, "In the final analysis, when it comes to
the Constitution, we are the highest court in the land." 8 3
I do not know of course, if this is what motivated Powe or Friedman. I do know,
however, that they both reached out to certain parts of the political-science literature and
not others. Powe writes that he has written a "law professor's book enlightened by
political science and history."84 And Friedman is deeply engaged with much politicalscience writing. Yet it remains curious that they invested so much time, at this historical
moment, in producing monumental books that add detail and color but no new
theoretical insight.
In the end, both books remind readers that constitutional interpretation is not set in
stone. Their message is that democratic citizens have an important role to play in
influencing the society in which we live. This is a message that can never be repeated too
often, especially when it is done so well.

83. Friedman, supran. 7, at 385.
84. Powe, supran. 1, at viii.
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